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Bob Wessels is preacher and salesman at the same time. The preacher has a
preference for natural obligations, gentlemen’s agreements and fair contract
terms. The salesman has a fine nose for the needs of legal professionals. In
combining the two he serves as an inspiring example of Dutch scholarship.
1. Bob’s call of duty
The liquidator of Favini Meerssen B.V. brought an actio Pauliana against
Favini Real Estate B.V. The Favini family allegedly divided the company
to place its assets out of reach of its creditors. With no property in its
estate, Favini Meerssen would be unable to fulfil its obligations. However,
Favini Real Estate claimed that the actio Pauliana is not applicable in case
of a legal division, because the protection of the interests of creditors is
dealt with by Article 2:334u of the Dutch Civil Code (CC) instead. Under
this exclusive regime, only the district court would be able to declare the
division void, within a period of six months after the division has been
made public, and only in well-defined situations.
Two concurring regimes, with different aims and levels of protection.
Is the liquidator free to choose or does either the actio Pauliana or Article
2:334a CC apply exclusively? Dutch private law knows a convenient
method of interpretation to solve such issues of concurrence. In this
contribution, we would like to explore whether this method could be used
in the area of European insolvency law. Thereby, we obey the call of duty
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to civil lawyers by Bob Wessels himself to participate in the discussion on
the future of insolvency law in Europe.1
First, we will introduce the general concept of concurrence and its
application in Dutch insolvency law (section 2). In literature, it has been
questioned whether this method may be applied to solve conflicts of rules
belonging to different legal systems (section 3). The Favini case demon-
strates that, while harmonisation of insolvency proceedings is still at low
ebb, issues of concurrence may nonetheless arise as a result of the
Directive concerning the division of public limited liability companies
(section 4). Regrettably, the concept of concurrence is overlooked by the
Dutch Supreme Court in this case (section 5). Yet, applying the concept
of concurrence in a broader European context does not go without
saying. Issues of concurrence may also arise as a result of private
international law, when different grounds for a claim are being judged
in different jurisdictions, or under different applicable laws (section 6).
Finally, Bob Wessels will receive a call of duty in return (section 7).
2. Concurrence in Dutch private law
In practice, parties and courts are often confronted with different rules
and remedies, concurrently applicable to the case at hand. Their aim,
nature and purpose may differ. One regime may be more advantageous
for the claimant and less favourable to the position of the defendant. For
example, the establishment, scope and prescription of liability may differ
depending upon whether the claimant frames his action in contract or in
tort. This prompts the question: what influence does one regime exert on
the application of another regime? May they be applied simultaneously, or
should one of the regimes be excluded in favour of the other? And if the
latter is the case, who should make that choice: the claimant or the court?
In Dutch private law, a particular method of interpretation is being
used to answer those questions. Its purpose is not to direct the outcome
of each individual case,2 but to guide the approach to conflicts of rules,
1 Bob Wessels issued this call on the occasion of the presentation of his Reports on
‘Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe’ before the Netherlands Association for
Civil Law; noted by H.N. Schelhaas & M.W. Scheltema, ‘Een geharmoniseerd Europees
Insolventierecht?’, NTBR 2013-26, p. 232-233.
2 Snijders and Brunner already put the usability of the doctrine for this purpose in
perspective, see W. Snijders, ‘Samenloop van wetsbepalingen in het nieuwe BW’, in: J.F.
Glastra van Loon (Ed.), Speculum Langemeijer, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1973, p. 454;
C.J.H. Brunner, Beginselen van samenloop, Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1984, p. 16.
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and to substantiate the resulting judgment. Its approach is not based on
maxims such as ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’, but focuses on the
substantive importance of the conflicting rules.3 The Dutch Supreme
Court takes the freedom of choice of the claimant as a starting point:
‘When there is concurrence of multiple but distinctly applicable legal grounds on
which the claimant may base his action, the basic principle is that these are
applicable cumulatively, provided that the claimant may choose as he sees fit,
whenever the legal grounds lead to different legal consequences which cannot be
awarded at the same time. This basic principle is set aside when this is prescribed
by, or inevitably follows from, statutory law.’4
When multiple rules could be applied on the same legal facts, the claimant
may choose which rule(s) he wishes to invoke (free concurrence). Only when
those rules cannot be applied cumulatively – because this would go
against logic, or against the wording or intention of the law – the basic
principle may be abandoned. In such cases, the claimant must make a
choice, unless the law prescribes that one rule is to be applied exclusively.5
That is a tall order: exclusive application is awarded only ‘when the law so
prescribes or inevitably involves’.
This framework has been applied in the area of insolvency law as well.
If the interests of a creditor have been violated by a legal act of the debtor,
the creditor is entitled to declare this act null and void on the basis of the
general actio Pauliana (art. 3:45 CC). But the conduct of the debtor – and
possibly the third party – may equally constitute a tort. Bringing such an
action in tort could be advantageous for the creditor – for example when
the actio Pauliana is already barred by prescription, or because the creditor
3 C.J.H. Brunner, Beginselen van samenloop, Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1984, p. 14-15.
4 HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007/621 (Fernhout/Essent) at 4.2: ‘Uitgangspunt bij samenloop
van meer op zichzelf toepasselijke rechtsgronden voor een door eiser gesteld vorder-
ingsrecht is dat deze cumulatief van toepassing zijn, met dien verstande dat, indien die
rechtsgronden tot verschillende rechtsgevolgen leiden welke niet tegelijkertijd kunnen
intreden, eiser daaruit naar eigen inzicht een keuze mag maken. Dit uitgangspunt lijdt
slechts uitzondering indien de wet dat voorschrijft of onvermijdelijk meebrengt.’
5 This terminology differs from the terms ‘cumulation’ and ‘alternativity’, widely used in
Dutch private law literature. These terms suggest that multiple grounds are to be applied
simultaneously (‘cumulation’) and that claimants may only choose once the grounds
may not be applied simultaneously (‘alternativity’). Through this terminology, the
principle of party autonomy seems wrongly exposed. See A.G. Castermans & H.B.
Krans, ‘Samenloop en de toegang tot de rechter’, in: A.G. Castermans et. al. (Eds.), Ex
libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 158.
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wishes to claim additional damages.6 Already in 1957, the Dutch Supreme
Court made clear that the actio Pauliana does not trump the possibility to
bring an action in tort.7 Although there clearly is a genus-species relationship
between the two rules, application of tort law is not excluded because of
the special character of the actio Pauliana.8 The creditor may choose to
bring either one of the actions, or both.9
As soon as the debtor goes bankrupt, the Dutch Bankruptcy Act
enters into force. In one respect, this limits the opportunities for
individual creditors. Because the Act gives the liquidator the sole power10
to obtain relief on behalf of the creditors, individual creditors may no
longer bring an actio Pauliana under Art. 3:45 CC.11 Here, the principle
of free concurrence of actions is trumped by the exclusivity of the
Bankruptcy Act.
As for the rest, the principle has been upheld.12 For instance, the
liquidator may choose to sue a third party for damages, even though the
debtor – who went bankrupt – would not have had such a claim in tort
himself.13 Furthermore, creditors themselves may bring such actions against
third parties. In all these situations, the principle of free concurrence of
actions was emphasised by the Supreme Court. The argument that such
6 F.P. van Koppen, Actio pauliana en onrechtmatige daadvordering, Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p.
20-21.
7 HR 28 June 1957, NJ 1957/514 (Erba/Amsterdamsche Bank) m.nt. L.E.H. Rutten.
8 F.P. van Koppen, Actio pauliana en onrechtmatige daadvordering, Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p.
21-22; J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘De actio Pauliana begrepen als vordering uit onrechtmatige
daad’, in: L. Timmerman (Ed.), Vragen rond de faillissementspauliana (Insolad Jaarboek
1998), Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p. 51-64.
9 See HR 13 March 1959, NJ 1959/579 m.nt. L.E.H. Rutten (Van Vliet/Amsterdamsche
Bank); HR 8 November 1985, NJ 1987/170 m.nt. W.L. Haardt; HR 12 May 1989, NJ
1990/130 m.nt. W.H. Heemskerk (AaBe/Ontvanger). See J.A. Ankum, De Pauliana buiten
faillissement in het Nederlandse recht sedert de codificatie, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1963, p.
85 et seq.; C.A. Boukema, Civielrechtelijke samenloop (diss. Leiden), Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk
Willink 1966, p. 31 et seq.; W. Snijders, ‘Samenloop van wetsbepalingen in het nieuwe
BW’, in: J.F. Glastra van Loon (Ed.), Speculum Langemeijer, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink
1973, p. 456.
10 Art. 49 Faillissementswet.
11 Art. 42 Faillissementswet.
12 Even if it is clear that there has been no fraudulent transfer of assets under the
Bankruptcy Act, an action in tort may still be successful, see HR 16 June 2000,
NJ 2000/578 m.nt. P. van Schilfgaarde (Cuijk/ABN AMRO) at 3.6.
13 HR 14 January 1983, NJ 1983/597 (Peeters q.q./Gatzen), m.nt. B. Wachter. Confirmed by
the Supreme Court in HR 8 November 1991, NJ 1992/174 and HR 23 December
1994, NJ 1996/628.
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actions should be limited by exclusivity of the Bankruptcy Act, or by the
principle of paritas creditorum, was rejected.14
3. Concurrence in European private law
So far, the doctrine of concurrence has been used to solve conflicts within
Dutch private law.15 May its criteria be used to solve conflicts of rules
belonging to different constitutional levels, or even different jurisdictions?
This is a relevant question. Nowadays, various layers of public law and
European law are influencing private law.16 The same is true for the area of
insolvency law. Although the efforts of the European legislator have – so far
– concentrated on the coordination of the international jurisdiction,
recognition and applicable laws for cross-border insolvency proceedings,17
three developments may be mentioned here. First, the European Parliament
expressed that it deems harmonisation ‘worthwhile and achievable’,18 and
in its response the European Commission indicated it is studying the impact
14 HR 21 December 2001, NJ 2005, 95 (Lunderstädt/de Kok) at 3.4.4 and HR 21 December
2001, NJ 2005, 96 (Sobi/Hurks) m.nt. S.C.J.J. Kortmann at 5.1.3.
15 Cf. A.S. Hartkamp, ‘Samenloop in het Europese privaatrecht’, in Th.M. de Boer et al.
(Eds.), Strikwerda’s Conclusies, Deventer: Kluwer 2011, p. 157.
16 Several textbooks have been published about the interaction between European law and
private law: A.S. Hartkamp, Mr. C. Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het
Nederlands burgerlijk recht. 3. Vermogensrecht algemeen. Deel I. Europees recht en
Nederlands vermogensrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2011; A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh &
L.A.D. Keus (Eds.), De invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse privaa-
trecht, Deel I. Algemeen Deel (Serie Onderneming en Recht, deel 42-I), Deventer:
Kluwer 2007. In Belgium, the new Algemeen Deel is dedicated to ‘Private and public
law in a multilayered framework of regulation, judicial interpretation and rule applica-
tion’: W. van Gerven & S. Lierman, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht (I). Algemeen
Deel. Veertig jaar later, Mechelen: Kluwer 2010.
17 See Recital 13, Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency
proceedings.
18 European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the
Commissionon insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006
(INI)) (2013/C 153 E/01). In its response, the Commission indicated it wishes to
promote the modernisation of the EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings as a first
step, while studying on the impact arising from differences between national insolvency
laws on the functioning of the internal market. See Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee, A new European approach to business failure and insolvency, Strasbourg,
12.12.2012COM(2012) 742 final, par. 5. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/
insolvency-comm_en.pdf (last visited on 3 February 2014).
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arising from differences between national insolvency laws, with a view to a
possible future harmonisation.19 Second, harmonised European company
law may have an impact on insolvency law, as the Favini case demonstrates
(sections 4-5). Third, issues of concurrence may arise in the context of
private international law as well (section 6).
Different layers of law require coordination. May the doctrine of
concurrence be used to that effect? It is evident that in these cases the
solution will not just be a matter of interpretation, but will involve
constitutional principles, such as hierarchy and supremacy.20 The influ-
ence of such principles is a reason for Bakels to argue against the use of
this method to approach ‘vertical’ conflicts,21 and a reason for Sieburgh
to argue that no issues of concurrence arise once a national norm is
contrary to EU law. In such a situation, EU law puts national law out of
action.22 According to these authors, the concept of concurrence may
only play a marginal role once different layers of law are applicable on one
single case.
But let us not jump to conclusions. For one, this would ignore that also
in constitutional law, an increasing number of authors argues that the
outcome of a conflict of rules should mainly be directed by the substance of
the norms involved, and not just by arguments of hierarchy. This may best
be illustrated by referring to De Búrca, who distinguishes ‘two prevalent
and broadly contrasting intellectual approaches (…) to the multiplication,
overlap and conflict of normative orders in the global realm’.23 On the
one end, there is the strong constitutionalist approach, advocating ‘some kind
19 However, the Commission indicated that the modernisation of the EU Regulation on
insolvency proceedings has its priority. See Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee,
A new European approach to business failure and insolvency, Strasbourg, 12.12.2012 COM-
(2012) 742 final, par. 5. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-comm_en.
pdf. (last visited on 3 February 2014).
20 Cf. A.S. Hartkamp, ‘Samenloop in het Europese privaatrecht’, in Th.M. de Boer et al.
(Eds.), Strikwerda’s Conclusies, Deventer: Kluwer 2011, p. 158.
21 F.B. Bakels, ‘Aspecten van samenloop (I)’, WPNR 2009-6796, par. 3.1.
22 C.H. Sieburgh, ‘Ich weiß nicht was soll es bedeuten’, in: A.G. Castermans et al. (Eds.),
Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 243 and p. 249-250. Sieburgh
does point out that national private law may still have to solve several problems of
concurrence after a national norm has been put out of action.
23 G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After
Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal 2010-1, p. 31. See generally R. Barents, ‘De
voorrang van unierecht in het perspectief van constitutioneel pluralisme’, SEW 2009-
21; A. von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the !
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of systemic unity’ and proposing ‘an agreed hierarchy (…) to resolve
conflicts of authority between levels and sites’.24 On the other end, there is
the strong pluralist approach, emphasizing the plurality of diverse national and
international normative systems, and favouring diversity and difference
above either ‘sovereigntist or universal-harmonisation schemes’.25 Within
this debate, De Búrca proposes a soft constitutionalist approach, which ‘does
not insist on a clear hierarchy of rules but rather on commonly negotiated
and shared principles for addressing conflict’.26 Such criticism resonates
with private lawyers:
‘A – perhaps – textbook answer is to cite the principle of supremacy and to
therefore arrive at the hierarchically laced conclusion that one set of values
simply trumps the other within EU law’s system of conflict resolution. Such a
remark is conceivably outmoded and in this context anachronistic, especially
given that the principle was crafted with inter-state rather than private relation-
ships in mind.’27
Although Europe’s systems of private law share the same issues, for
example with regard to the interaction between contract and tort law,28
they do not seem to share a commonly negotiated method of interpretation
yet. Solutions to particular issues of concurrence seem to differ greatly in
theory,29 and few countries seem to be acquainted with a general concept of
concurrence, fully developed in academic discourse and legal practice.30
relationship between international and domestic constitutional law’, International Journal
of Constitutional Law 2008-6, p. 397-413; N. Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and
Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’, Int. J. Constitutional
Law 2008, p. 397.
24 G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After
Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal 2010-1, p. 36-37.
25 Ibid., p. 32-33.
26 Ibid, p. 39.
27 G. Low & E. Muir, ‘The Privatization of European law and Constitutionalization of
Private Law: Two Sides of the Same Coin (Editorial)’, European Review of Private Law
2013-5/6, p.1161. Cf. W. van Gerven & S. Lierman, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht (I).
Algemeen Deel. Veertig jaar later, Mechelen: Kluwer 2010, p. 170.
28 Cf. C. von Bar & U. Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property
Law in Europe. A Comparative Study, München: Sellier European Law Publishers 2004.
29 For example, the (apparent) difference between the principle of free concurrence of actions
and the principle of non-cumul des responsabilités. Either tort law is excluded as a matter of
principle (non-cumul), or the least advantageous regime is excluded as a result of the
claimant’s choice (free concurrence).
30 This was already noted with remorse by C.J.H. Brunner, Beginselen van samenloop,
Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1984, p. 3.
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That is not to say that there is no need for such a method, crafted with
private relationships in mind. Moreover, convergence on these issues seems
possible. Some of the basic principles discussed above are recognisable in
European private law as well. In the Draft Common Frame of Reference for
example, free concurrence of actions is the basic principle – with respect to
the relationship of the law on non-contractual liability to other areas of
private law,31 or with regard to the different remedies for breach of
contract.32 The principle is set aside only when remedies are not incompa-
tible, and a demand for subsidiarity is granted only when one regime seeks
to regulate the legal consequences in an exclusive way.33 Similar provisions
are to be found in the proposed Common European Sales Law,34 while the
European Court of Justice applies the same basic principles when dealing
with concurring provisions of EU law.35
From a constitutional and private law perspective, it seems as if an
attempt to apply this method of interpretation is not ill-fated from the
outset. But will its application be helpful in practice? To answer that
question, we return to the Favini case, where the liquidator attempted to
unwind the division of the Favini company, regulated by an EU Directive,
with an actio Pauliana.
31 E.g. Art. VI.-1:103 DCFR.
32 Art. III.-3:102 DCFR. Another example is Art. II.-1:107 (2) DCFR, which stipulates
that mixed contracts are governed by all applicable rules, unless this is contrary to the
nature and purpose of the contract. See for exceptions to this rule Art. II.-1:107 (3)
DCFR.
33 See e.g. C. von Bar & E. Clive (Eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European
Private Law. Vol. 4, Munich: Sellier 2009, p. 3117. However, Art. I.-1:102 (5) DCFR does
mention the lex specialis principle: ‘Where there is a general rule and a special rule
applying to a particular situation within the scope of the general rule, the special rule
prevails in any case of conflict.’
34 E.g. Art. 106 (6) and 131 (4) CESL: ‘Remedies which are not incompatible may be
cumulated’; Art. 57 CESL: ‘A party who is entitled to a remedy under this Chapter
[‘Defects in consent’, AGC/RdG] in circumstances which afford that party a remedy
for non-performance may pursue either of those remedies.’ See A.G. Castermans & R.
de Graaff, ‘Samenloop in een meerlagige rechtsorde. Verval en verjaring in het
Europees contractenrecht’, in: C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd et al. (Eds.), Rechtsvinding in
een meerlagige rechtsorde (BWKJ 28), Deventer: Kluwer 2013, p. 43-65.
35 Cf. A.S. Hartkamp, ‘Samenloop in het Europese privaatrecht’, in Th.M. de Boer et al.
(Eds.), Strikwerda’s Conclusies, Deventer: Kluwer 2011, p. 157. Hartkamp refers for
example to the concurrence between free movement rights and competition law – ECJ
15 December 1995, C-415/93, ECR 1995, p. I-4921 (UEFA/Bosman) – or between
different applicable directives – ECJ 22 April 1999, C-423/97, ECR 1999, p. I-2195
(Travel Vac SL/Sanchis).
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4. The impact of a division of a company on the rights of creditors
Favini S.p.A. (Italy) is the parent-company of Favini N.V. (hereafter: Favini
Nederland), which in turn is the parent company of Favini Meerssen B.V.
(hereafter: Favini Meerssen), a paper factory located in the Netherlands.
Favini S.p.A. granted Favini Nederland credit, which extended this credit to
Favini Meerssen.36 The original loan had been granted by a consortium of
Italian banks, which was awarded a first mortgage right on the premises of
Favini Meerssen in return. After a division operation within the Favini
family on 29/30 December 2005, the premises owned by Favini Meerssen
(book value: € 8.530.000) were acquired by the new Favini Real Estate B.V.,
as well as a debt owed by Favini Meerssen to Favini Nederland as a result of
the existing credit arrangements (book value: € 8.529.999).37 Two years
later, Favini Meerssen went bankrupt.
It is clear that such a division may adversely affect the interests of
creditors. What safeguards does the law provide? The legal division of
public and private limited liability companies is regulated by Article 2:334a
CC et seq.38 This regime prescribes the procedure in great detail. First of all,
the boards of the companies involved must draft a detailed proposal,39
including information on the division of assets.40 This proposal must be
36 See for a description of the factual background also the Opinion of A-G Timmerman,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:922, par. 1.
37 Although the mother company is Italian, the division of Favini Meerssen itself has
been a national affair. Cross-border division is not regulated in the Dutch Civil Code.
It is questionable whether such a division would succeed, because Art. 2:334b CC
prescribes that the legal persons involved in the division must have the same legal
status. This potentially conflicts with the right of establishment as guaranteed under
Article 49 et seq. TFEU. Several judgments of the ECJ/CJEU are relevant in this
regard: ECJ 27 September 1988, 81/87, ECR 1988, p. 5483 (Daily Mail); ECJ 5
November 2002, C-208/00, ECR 2002, p. I-9919 (Überseering); ECJ 13 December
2005, C-411/03, ECR 2005, p. I-10805 (Sevic); ECJ 16 December 2008, C-210/06,
ECR 2008, p. I-9641 (Cartesio); CJEU 29 November 2011, C-371/10, ECR 2011, p.
I-12273 (National Grid Indus); CJEU 12 July 2012, C-378/10, NJ 2012/581 (VALE).
See for such a discussion on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions: W.J.M.
van Veen, ‘Grensoverschrijdende omzetting, –fusie en –splitsing na het VALE-
arrest’, WPNR 2013-6981, p. 512-525.
38 For an in-depth discussion about this regime, see B. Wessels, ‘Splitsing van het
onsplitsbare? Enige vermogensrechtelijke kanttekeningen bij “splitsing” als re-
chtshandeling tot overgang van vermogen van een rechtspersoon onder algemene
titel’, Stichting & Vereniging 1997, p. 175-185.
39 Art. 2:334f CC.
40 Art. 2:334f (d) CC.
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accompanied by an explanation in writing, including the reasons for
dividing the company and the legal, economic and social consequences.41
These documents, including annual accounts and reports, have to be
submitted to the commercial register.42 The shareholders’ meeting has to
be informed by the board,43 and the proposal has to be announced in a
national newspaper.44 Creditors are granted a month to file their objection
against the intended division, based on the ground that their legal relation-
ship is not being transferred in full,45 or that they have not been provided
security at their request.46 The division is finally decided upon by the
shareholders’ meeting,47 but will only enter into force through a notarial
act.48
Once this act has been passed, a court may declare the division void,
not only because the notarial act is not authentic49 or because other
formal requirements have not been met,50 but also because the underlying
shareholders’ decision is void (‘nietig’), invalid (‘niet van kracht) or may be
avoided (‘grond tot vernietiging’).51 Creditors should not expect much from
41 Art. 2:334g CC.
42 Art. 2:334h CC.
43 Art. 2:334i CC.
44 Art. 2:334h (3) CC.
45 Art. 2:334j CC.
46 Art. 2:334k CC.
47 Art. 2:334m (1) CC.
48 Art. 2:334n (1) CC. This notarial act must be passed within six months after public
announcement of the proposal.
49 Art. 2:334u (1)(a) CC.
50 See Art. 2:334u (1)(b) CC. Apart from the situation described in Art. 2:334b (7) CC, a
dissolved or bankrupt legal person cannot be involved in a division (Art. 2:334b (5) and
(6) CC); the notarial act may not be passed while creditors have filed their objection
(Art. 2:334l (3) CC); the notary has to declare that all the requirements have been met
(Art. 2:334n (2) CC, first sentence). For foundations (“stichtingen”) there is another
requirement (Art. 2:334u (1)(d) CC): a court has to confirm the decision by the board of
the corporation (Art. 2:334m (5) CC).
51 Art. 2:334u (1)(c) CC. This part is therefore governed by the general nullity rules under
the Dutch Civil Code. Cf. B. Wessels, ‘Splitsing van het onsplitsbare? Enige vermo-
gensrechtelijke kanttekeningen bij “splitsing” als rechtshandeling tot overgang van
vermogen van een rechtspersoon onder algemene titel’, Stichting & Vereniging 1997, p.
179. According to Wessels, the special regime of Art. 2:334u derogates from the general
nullity rules under Boek 3, Title 2 of the Dutch Civil Code.
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these possibilities.52 A shareholders’ decision is void only when it is contrary
to the law or the articles of association.53 It may be avoided only in the event
of non-compliance with formal requirements,54 or if the decision is contrary
to good faith.55 The latter test focuses on the relationship between the legal
person and those persons involved in its organisation, and not on the
standards of good faith between creditors and debtors.56Moreover, the court
shall not declare a division void if the omission is corrected,57 or if it is
problematic to reverse the legal consequences of the division.58When formal
requirements have been met, creditors or liquidators face a brick wall.59
That is not to say that creditors are left without arms. Once the
companies have been divided, creditors may still request amendment or
termination of their contracts,60 and claim the resulting damages.61 After
the notarial act has been submitted to the public registry, creditors have
six months to bring such actions – either targeted at the division62 or at
52 In this paragraph, invalid decisions are not being discussed separately, because this topic
is beyond the scope of our contribution. For a further explanation on these subtleties,
see A.J.M. Klein Wassink, Toetsing van besluiten in het rechtspersonenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer
2012, p. 85-86.
53 Art. 2:14 (1) CC.
54 Art. 2:15 (1)(a) CC concerns legal or statutory requirements (‘strijd met wettelijke of
statutaire bepalingen die het tot stand komen van besluiten regelen’), Art. 2:15 (1)(c) CC
concerns internal rules and regulations (‘strijd met een reglement’).
55 Art. 2:15 (1)(b) CC, which refers to Art. 2:8 CC.
56 Art. 2:8 (1) CC. It is also questionable whether creditors would qualify as ‘stakeholders’
with a reasonable interest, necessary to bring such an action in the first place. See Art.
2:15 (3)(a) CC and A.J.M. Klein Wassink, Toetsing van besluiten in het rechtspersonenrecht,
Deventer: Kluwer 2012, p. 70-74.
57 Art. 2:334u (4)(a) CC.
58 Art. 2:334u (4)(b) CC.
59 Cf. J.W. van de Horst, ‘Positie van schuldeisers bij een juridische splitsing: artikel 2:334u
BW onder de loep’, V&O 2011-2, p. 24.
60 Art. 2:334r (1) CC.
61 Art. 2:334r (3) CC.
62 Art. 2:334u (3) CC. Such a cause of action may only be brought by ‘a member, a
shareholder, a board member or another stakeholder’ (Art. 2:334u (2) CC). Some
authors claim that creditors may not bring such an action, because they have not been
involved directly in the division, or because their position is guaranteed by other legal
safeguards. See e.g. M. van Olffen, F.K. de Bruijn & P.H.M. Simonis, Splitsing van
ondernemingen, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2004, p. 102; M.J.G.C.
Raaijmakers, ‘“Belanghebbende” bij vernietiging van door de rechtbank goedgekeurde
fusie van stichtingen’, Ars Aequi 1992, p. 421-426. Other authors submit that there is no
reason to assume that the legislator intended to exclude creditors from bringing !
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the existing contractual obligations.63 After expiry of this period, creditors
may only obtain relief by holding the legal persons concerned liable for
certain existing debts64 or obligations.65
In literature, it has been questioned whether this regime offers enough
protection to creditors.66 Especially foreign creditors may not always have
the awareness and knowledge to bring their actions in time.67 In this case,
the liquidator submitted that the Favini family deliberately used the
division to place its property out of reach of its creditors. With no
property in its estate, Favini Meerssen would be unable to fulfil its
obligations to its creditors. Moreover, the actual value of the premises
would have been € 25.340.000 – and not € 8.530.000 – at the time of
division. In order to obtain relief on behalf of the creditors, the liquidator
brought an actio Pauliana, claiming that the division was void on the
grounds of Article 42 of the Faillissementswet (the Dutch Bankruptcy
Act, hereafter: Fw). Under this regime, a court would be able to engage in
an assessment of the conduct of the companies involved. Furthermore,
creditors and liquidators would not be bound to go to court within six
months after submission of the notarial act to the public registry, nor
would a possible nullity of that act be governed by the formal require-
ments of Article 2:334u CC.
Two concurring regimes, with different aims and levels of protection.
Is the liquidator free to choose, or does either the actio Pauliana or Article
2:334u CC apply exclusively?
such actions – a position supported by us as well. See e.g. J.W. van de Horst, ‘Positie van
schuldeisers bij een juridische splitsing: artikel 2:334u BWonder de loep’, V&O 2011-2,
p. 21-25. For a similar viewpoint and further references, see the Opinion of A-G
Timmerman in the Favini case, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:922, par. 3.9 and endnote 16.
63 Art. 2:334r (2) CC.
64 Art. 2:334s (4) CC.
65 Art. 2:334t CC.
66 J.N. Schutte-Veenstra, ‘Enkele kanttekeningen bij het vennootschappelijk verzetrecht
van crediteuren’, TVVS 1996-11, p. 293-298.
67 A-G Timmerman casted his doubts about this protection as well, see Opinion A-G
Timmerman, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:922, par. 3.10.
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5. The concept of concurrence overlooked by the Dutch Supreme
Court
The EU Directive on which this regime is based, covers only situations in
which the company being divided ceases to exist.68 However, the Dutch
legislator extended its application to situations like the Favini case, where
the company being divided continues to exist.69 Furthermore, the Dutch
legislator declared the regime applicable to all legal persons in Book 2
of the Dutch Civil Code.70 Although this is therefore not a matter of
application of EU law, it seems correct to take the Directive into
consideration as well.71
While implementing this regime in the Dutch Civil Code, the legislator
did not consider the possibility of bringing an actio Pauliana by liquidators
or creditors. In fact, the state of bankruptcy was only mentioned in the
context of the regime itself: could a bankrupt company be divided?72
Although the Community legislator emphasised that the interests of
creditors should be protected, it deemed legal certainty for the companies
and third parties involved in the division important as well. According to
the Community legislator, ‘the cases in which nullity can arise must be
limited by providing that defects be remedied wherever that is possible
and by restricting the period within which nullification proceedings
may be commenced’.73 To this effect, the nullity rules for divisions have
to meet certain boundary conditions, as we have seen above. However,
the substantive decision to declare the decision of the shareholders’ meeting
68 Art. 17 (c), Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on
Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability
companies, OJ L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 47–54.
69 Art. 2:334a (1) and (3) CC. According to the Dutch legislator, these situations would
involve the same interests. See MvT, TK 1995-1996, 24 702, nr. 3, p. 3, nr. 7.
70 Art. 2:334b (3) and (4) CC.
71 This technique of harmonious interpretation has been employed by the Dutch Supreme
Court as well, also when the subject matter itself was linked to, but not directly
governed by, EU law. See e.g. HR 2 November 2012, RvdW 2012, 1371 (T-Mobile/Klomp)
at par. 4.1., where the Supreme Court interprets Art. 7:442 CC in accordance with the
Directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the Member State relating to
self-employed commercial agents, even though the latter only governs the trade in
goods between Member States.
72 MvT, TK 1995-1996, 24 702, nr. 3, p. 6-7 and p. 20-21.
73 Preamble, Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Article
54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies, OJ
L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 47–54.
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null and void is left to national law.74 Moreover, the Directive ‘shall not
affect the laws of the Member States on the nullity of a division pronounced
following any supervision of legality’.75 From the perspective of the general
concept of concurrence, the actio Pauliana should therefore not be excluded.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Dutch legislator did
not pay attention to this specific problem. Nonetheless, it ruled that – in
view of the legislator’s intention to limit the cases in which nullity can
arise – bringing an actio Pauliana was not allowed. The regime under
Article 2:334u CC had to be applied strictly, and exclusively.76 This
decision was upheld by the Dutch Supreme Court. If an actio Pauliana
would be allowed, this would devalue the legal certainty offered by Article
2:334 CC, according to the Supreme Court. The ‘specific norm’ of Article
2:334u CC is therefore meant to be ‘exclusive’,77 leaving no room for a
possible avoidance of the division under Article 42 Fw.78
Clearly, and understandably, the Supreme Court deemed it important
to do justice to the specific conditions under Article 2:334u CC. To obtain
this result, the Supreme Court followed the straight and narrow path of
exclusive application. Interestingly, jurisprudence shows another possible
route. On earlier occasions, the Supreme Court allowed the claimant to
bring an action in tort, while allowing the defendant to invoke the special
liability rules or prescription periods in contract law.79 For example, an
employer may bring an action in tort against former directors or
74 Art. 19 (1) of the Directive: ‘The laws of Member States may lay down nullity rules for
divisions in accordance with the following conditions only: (…) (b) divisions which have
taken effect pursuant to Article 15 may be declared void only if there has been no
judicial or administrative preventive supervision of their legality, or if they have not been
drawn up and certified in due legal form, or if it is shown that the decision of the general meeting
is void or voidable under national law.’ Our italics.
75 Art. 19 (3) of the Directive.
76 Court of Appeal ’s Hertogenbosch 27 March 2012, JOR 2012/301, at 4.16.
77 HR 20 December 2013, RvdW 2014/86 (Schreurs/Favini Real Estate) at 4.1.3. Similarly:
HR 20 December 2013, RvdW 2014/134 (Schreurs/Favini Real Estate).
78 HR 20 December 2013, RvdW 2014/86 (Schreurs/Favini Real Estate) at 4.1.4.
79 See HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007, 621, with a case note by K.F. Haak (in cases concerning
a collision of inland navigation vessels, the claimant has the choice between bringing an
action for damages under tort law, or under collision law, but both actions are governed
by the short prescription period under Art. 8:1793 CC); HR 2 December 2011, NJ
2012, 197, with a case note by T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai (the long prescription period under
Art. 3:310 (2) CC is applicable to an action under Art. 6:175 CC, but also when such an
action is based on Art. 6:162 CC); HR 2 October 1998, NJ 1999, 682, with a case note
by J.B.M. Vranken (the long prescription period under Art. 3:310 (2) CC is also
applicable when the action is based on tort law).
40
T H E G E N E R A L C O N C E P T O F C O N C U R R E N C E
employees, but the establishment and scope of liability are governed by
special rules, rooted in company and labour law.80 And a buyer may bring
an action in tort, but this action is governed by the (shorter) prescription
periods under Article 7:23 CC to the extent that it concerns the
nonconformity of the delivered goods.81 Thus, the heart of the problem
is removed: the claimant preserves his right to choose the most
advantageous action, while possible pleas by the defendant are taken
into account – even when they belong to a different regime.
Admittedly, this approach is more difficult where two applicable regimes
prescribe recourse to different courts. Such questions have been raised in the
context of labour proceedings, where an employer may choose to bring an
action in contract before the “cantonal court” and an action in tort before
the district court. Legal representation is compulsory before the district
court, but not before the “cantonal court”. Although there are no
indications that recourse to the district court should be excluded, the
petitioned court could examine whether a referral would be appropriate.82
Reflecting on the Favini case, it is surprising that the Supreme Court
shows the firm intention to exclude recourse to the actio Pauliana.83 In our
opinion, the Supreme Court could perfectly have allowed liquidators to
bring an action under Article 42 Fw. After all, Article 2:334u CC does not
seek to regulate all legal consequences in an exclusive way. If such an actio
Pauliana would be targeted at the division itself,84 it should be subject to
the formal requirements under Article 2:334u CC, which deems recourse
to a court within six months necessary.85 However, this should not
exclude the possibility to assess the conduct of the companies involved in
80 HR 2 March 2007, NJ 2007, 240 (Holding Nuts-bedrijf Westland/S c.s.), par. 3.4.4. Here, it
concerned the Articles 2:9 BW (director, not employee) and 7:661 BW (employees).
81 HR 21 April 2006, NJ 2006, 272 (Inno/Sluis); HR 29 June 2007, NJ 2008, 606
(Pouw/Visser).
82 A.G. Castermans & H.B. Krans, ‘Samenloop en de toegang tot de rechter’, in: A.G.
Castermans et al. (Eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 166-169.
83 The Supreme Court does so without referring to the doctrine of concurrence, as
opposed to the Advocate-General. See Opinion A-G Timmerman, ECLI:NL:
PHR:2013:922, par. 3.5 et seq.
84 Although authors agree that the division is a legal act (which would mean it satisfies the
conditions under Art. 42 Fw), there has been some debate on the exact characterisation.
See B. Wessels, ‘Splitsing van het onsplitsbare? Enige vermogensrechtelijke kanttekenin-
gen bij “splitsing” als rechtshandeling tot overgang van vermogen van een rechtsper-
soon onder algemene titel’, Stichting & Vereniging 1997, p. 178-179.
85 Where one regime prescribes recourse to a court (Art. 2:334u CC) and the other regime
does not (Art. 42 Fw), it would be appropriate to prescribe recourse to the court.
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the division.86 If such an actio Pauliana is not targeted at the division, but at
the shareholders’ decision, there is no reason at all to subject it to these
special rules. If such an action succeeds, this will bring about the nullity of
the decision, but not (yet) of the division – for which recourse to the court
remains necessary.87
We acknowledge that it may be problematic to reverse the legal
consequences of a division in some cases, which is exactly why the
legislator intended to afford the court a certain discretion under Article
2:334u (4)(b) CC. But the mere fact that reversing the legal consequences
of a division may sometimes be too complicated should not be a reason
to exclude recourse to the actio Pauliana in general. Some cases – such as
the Favini case – may turn out to be quite workable after all.88 Such a
case-by-case approach is more nuanced than the straight and narrow path
of exclusive application. In line with the general concept of concurrence,
it seeks to do justice to all the interests involved, including those of
creditors and liquidators.
6. Private International Law
Thus far, the concurrence between the actio Pauliana and the rules of the
tort and division regimes has been analysed in the context of Dutch and
European law. Yet, applying the concept of concurrence in a broader
European context does not go without saying. It is not certain that the
same court will be competent to assess the various actions. It is neither
certain that the actio Pauliana will be governed by the same national law as
the tort or division, nor is it certain which national rule of concurrence
applies. In private international law, the general concept of concurrence
has not been the subject of much academic attention.89 The existing
86 Cf. Art. 19 (3) Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on
Art. 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies,
OJ L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 47–54.
87 This outcome differs somewhat from the Opinion of A-G Timmerman, who deemed a
total exclusion far-fetched as well, but still confines the applicability of Art. 42 Fw to the
shareholders’ decision only. See ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:922, par. 3.13.
88 This was noted by A-G Timmerman as well, who calls it a ‘quite simple case with a
single transfer of property and debt’, see Opinion A-G Timmerman, ECLI:NL:
PHR:2013:922, endnote 27.
89 This has been noted by Th.M. de Boer, ‘Samenloop van verdragen en verordeningen op
het terrein van het internationaal familierecht’, FJR 2010/117, nr. 12, p. 308-315.
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contributions largely concern specific issues of concurrence between the
instruments of private international law itself.90
The basic principle under the Brussels I Regulation is that persons
domiciled in a EU Member State shall be sued in the courts of that state,
irrespective of their nationality.91 To decide whether such a person may be
sued in another Member State, the classification of the creditor’s or
liquidator’s claim will serve as a starting point. That is by no means an
easy task when the claim falls within the scope of different rules on
jurisdiction. A claim may relate to the contractual relationship – leading to
jurisdiction for the courts for the place of performance of the obligation
in question92 – or it may relate to tort law – leading to jurisdiction for the
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.93
The Brussels I Regulation does not apply to bankruptcy, proceedings
relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons,
judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.94 As a
consequence, the jurisdiction with respect to a claim based on tort law,
brought by the liquidator, will not be determined by the Brussels I Regulation,
but by the Insolvency Regulation.95 It is said that the liability of directors for
mismanagement falls within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation.96
90 De Boer refers to the limited scala of (Dutch) books on specific issues of concurrence
in private international law: J.B. Mus, Verdragsconflicten voor de Nederlandse rechter (diss.
RUU), Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1996; H. Stein, ‘Samenloop van executieverdra-
gen’, in: D.H. Beukenhorst et al., Offerhauskring 25 jaar, Deventer: Kluwer 1987, p. 185 et
seq.; L. Strikwerda, ‘Samenloopperikelen in het internationaal procesrecht: art. 57 EEX’,
in: T. Hartlief et al. (Eds.), CJHB (Brunnerbundel), Deventer: Kluwer 1994, p. 389 et seq.;
P. de Meij, Samenloop van CMR-verdrag en EEX-verordening (diss. RUG), Deventer: Kluwer
2003. A notable exception is M.V. Polak, ‘Contract, delict en IPR’, in I.S.J. Houben et al.
(red.), Samenloop, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, p. 129-147.
91 Art. 2 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (hereafter:
Brussels I Regulation).
92 Art. 5 (1)(a) Brussels I Regulation.
93 Art. 5 (3) Brussels I Regulation. Recently, the CJEU decided that liability for
mismanagement falls within the scope of Art. 5 (3) Brussels I, deciding that in those
situations, the ‘harmful event’ is situated in the place to which the activities carried out
by that company and the financial situation related to those activities are connected. See
CJEU 18 July 2013, C-147/12, not yet published (ÖFAB, Östergötlands Fastigheter AB).
94 Art. 1 (2)(b) Brussels I Regulation.
95 Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings
(hereafter: Insolvency Regulation).
96 P. Vlas, Rechtspersonen, Apeldoorn/Antwerpen: Maklu 2009, p. 198–199. Referred to by
A.A.H. van Hoek, ‘Doorbraak van aansprakelijkheid in het IPR’, Ars Aequi 2013, p.
951, footnote 6.
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The same counts for the actio Pauliana initiated by the liquidator,97 even if
it is brought against a person whose place of residence is not within the
territory of a Member State.98
Yet, actions initiated by individual creditors seem to fall outside the
scope of the Insolvency Regulation. The European Court of Justice has
decided that an actio Pauliana initiated by an individual creditor is to be
governed by the Brussels I Regulation.99 This Regulation does not
contain a special provision on the jurisdiction for an actio Pauliana brought
by a creditor, nor is this matter considered to fall within the scope of tort
law.100 Following the basic principle, such an action should therefore be
brought before the court of the State in which the defendant is
domiciled.101
As a consequence, different bases for a claim may be judged by
different courts. It does not go without saying that one court is competent
to assess the various grounds in the same proceedings.102 For example,
the European Court of Justice decided that a court having jurisdiction to
assess a tort claim under Article 5 (3) of the Brussels I Regulation, does
not have jurisdiction in so far as it is not based on tort law, because:
‘the “special jurisdictions” enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention (the
predecessor of the Regulation, AGC/RdG) constitute derogations from the
97 ECJ 12 February 2009, C-339/07, ECR 2009, p. I-767 (Seagon/Deko Marty Belgium).
98 CJEU 16 January 2014, C-328/12, not yet published (Schmid/Hertel).
99 CJEU 12 April 2012, C-213/10, not yet published (F-tex).
100 This has been decided for in the context of article 5(3) of the Convention of
27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (EEX Treaty); ECJ Justice 26 March 1992, C-261/90, ECR 1992,
p. I-2149, (Reichert/Dresdner Bank II) concerning the actio Pauliana in French law, whereby
a creditor seeks to obtain the revocation of a transfer of rights in rem in immovable
property by his debtor in a way which the creditor regards as being in fraud of his rights.
This decision is considered to be applicable under the Brussels I Regulation, see Groene
Serie Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Vlas), Verordening (EG) nr. 44/2001 betreffende de
rechterlijke bevoegdheid, de erkenning en de tenuitvoerlegging van beslissingen in
burgerlijke en handelszaken, Art. 5, comment 19.
101 The Italian Corte di Cassazione used Art. 5 (1) of the Brussels I Convention (the
forum contractus); referred to by Ilaria Pretelli, ‘Cross-border credit protection against
fraudulent transfers of assets. Actio Pauliana in the conflict of law’, Yearbook of Private
International Law 2011-13, p. 603.
102 Recently, the Dutch Supreme Court referred such a case to the CJEU, concerning the
jurisdiction to decide whether a board member should be held liable on a ground which
may be characterized as contractual, tortious and as a matter of labor law. See HR
24 January 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:164.
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principle that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State where the defendant
is domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively.’103
In several other judgments, the European Court of Justice reiterates that
the rules of special jurisdiction ‘cannot give rise to an interpretation going
beyond the cases envisaged by the regulation’.104
Does this imply that the competent court cannot coordinate the various
claims? The European Court of Justice, well aware of the disadvantages of
having different courts adjudicating different aspects of the same dispute,
pointed out that a plaintiff is always entitled to bring his action in its entirety
before the courts of the State of the defendant.105 Moreover, the first court
seized is – under certain circumstances – allowed to hear the case in its
entirety, provided that there is a connection between the actions brought
before the different courts.106
Still, a court with jurisdiction to assess an actio Pauliana may have to
deal with a defence based on the regime governing a division – as the
Favini case demonstrates. This, however, is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but of applicable law. According to Polak, in principle the applicable law
103 ECJ 27 September 1988, 189/87, ECR 1988, p. 5565 (Kalfelis/Schröder), par. 19; ECJ 27
October 1998, C-51/97, ECR 1998, p. I-6511 (Réunion européenne/Spliethoff ’s
Bevrachtingskantoor), par. 49.
104 CJEU 18 July 2013, C-147/12, not yet published (ÖFAB, Östergötlands Fastigheter AB),
par. 31. See e.g. ECJ 19 January 1993, C-89/91, ECR 1993, p. I-00139 (Shearson Lehmann
Hutton), par. 16; ECJ 15 January 2004, C-433/01 (Blijdenstein), par. 25; ECJ 10 June
2004, ECR 2004, p. I-6009 (Kronhofer), par. 14; ECJ 16 July 2009, C-189/08, ECR 2009,
p. I-06917 (Zuid-Chemie/Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek), par. 22.
105 ECJ 27 September 1988, 189/87, ECR 1988, p. 5565 (Kalfelis/Schröder), par. 20; ECJ 27
October 1998, C-51/97, ECR 1998, p. I-6511 (Réunion européenne/Spliethoff ’s
Bevrachtingskantoor), par. 51.
106 ECJ 27 September 1988, 189/87, ECR 1988, p. 5565 (Kalfelis/Schröder), par. 20; ECJ 27
October 1998, C-51/97, ECR 1998, p. I-6511 (Réunion européenne/Spliethoff ’s
Bevrachtingskantoor), par. 51. Polak questions this possibility, because, according to the
Court’s own case law, Art. 28 Brussels I Regulation does not in itself confer jurisdiction
to a court. See ECJ 24 June 1981, 150/80, ECR 1981, p. 1671 (Elefanten Schuh/Jacqmain),
par. 19; ECJ 27 October 1998, C-51/97, ECR 1998, p. I-6511 (Réunion européenne/
Spliethoff ’s Bevrachtingskantoor), par. 39; ECJ 5 October 1999, C-420/97, ECR 1999, p. I-
6747 (Leathertex/Bodetex), par. 38. According to Polak, it is also at odds with the basic
principle that a court is vested with jurisdiction only to the extent that this follows
directly from the specific rules under the Brussels I Regulation. See M.V. Polak,
‘Contract, delict en IPR’, in I.S.J. Houben et al. (Eds.), Samenloop, Deventer: Kluwer
2007, p. 136.
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should be found with respect to each claim separately.107 The issue of
concurrence is not considered a connecting factor. It does not influence
the application of (at least: Dutch) private international law. Each
claim must be judged on its own merits.108 The court is bound to award
the claim, irrespective the assessment of the other claim according to the
law of another state.109
At first sight, this consequence of Private International Law seems to
be perfectly in line with the first principle of the Dutch doctrine of
concurrence as described in section 2: a free concurrence of actions,
which fully respects the autonomy of the claimant. Yet, from the
perspective of the defendant, this does not hold true in case the line of
defence touches upon another ground that is to be assessed by the law of
another state. Take for example the Favini-case, in which the claim was
based on the actio Pauliana, while the defence was based on the division
regime. A comparative analysis learns that the conditions for bringing an
actio Pauliana differ from state to state,110 while the Division Directive
leaves some room for differentiation as to the conditions to be applied.
How should be decided whether the actio Pauliana fully governs the case at
107 M.V. Polak, ‘Contract, delict en IPR’, in I.S.J. Houben et al. (red.), Samenloop, Deventer:
Kluwer 2007, p. 138. He refers to a specific Dutch conflict-rule that was supposed to be
an exception to this principle: if a claimant based his claim on tort, while claimant and
defendant have a contractual relationship, a court is free to choose the law that governs
the contract, even with respect to the claim based on tort (Art. 5 Wet Conflictenrecht
Onrechtmatige Daad). As per 1 July 2011, Dutch Private International Law has been
embedded in the Civil Code (Book 10), since then this exception no longer applies.
108 C. von Bar & U. Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in
Europe. A Comparative Study, München: Sellier European Law Publishers 2004, p. 310-
314, show some exceptions to the lex loci delicti with regard to tort claims, once a
contractual relationship exists. They refer to responses that ‘uniformly stressed that the
diversity of conflict laws leads to substantial costs of obtaining information and entails
extra expense’ (p. 312).
109 M.V. Polak, ‘Contract, delict en IPR’, in I.S.J. Houben et al. (red.), Samenloop, Deventer:
Kluwer 2007, p. 141.
110 P.M. Veder, ‘Party Autonomy and Insolvency Law’, in: R. Westrik and J.A. van der
Weide (Eds.), Party Autonomy in International Property Law, Munich: Sellier 2011, p. 264
and 265, mentioning requirements of proof of collusion or awareness of the prejudice
to other creditors or fraudulent intent by the debtor, or the limitation to legal acts that
have been performed in a particular period prior to the opening of insolvency
proceedings. With references to J.J. Forner Delaygua (ed.), La protection del crédito en
Europea: La acción pauliana, Barcelona: Bosch 2000; P.R. Wood, Principles of International
Insolvency, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, p. 458 et seq.; and the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, part II, par. 1481-203.
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hand, or whether the specific guarantees of the division Directive are to
be respected?
The usual rules for finding the applicable law do not respond to this
question. Specific rules with regard to the applicable law on the actio
Pauliana are lacking, at least in the period before bankruptcy. Courts are
said to be guided by their perception of the substantial interests
involved.111 Once bankruptcy-proceedings have been opened, the law
applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be that of the
State within the territory of which such proceedings are opened, which
is called the ‘State of the opening of proceedings’.112 This law shall
also determine the nullity rules with regard to legal acts detrimental to
all the creditors.113 But it shall not apply where the person who
benefited from an act detrimental to all the creditors provides proof
that the said act is subject to the law of another Member State, and
that this law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the
relevant case.114
In theory, a court may be confronted with a claim which needs to be
assessed according to national law with a tradition of allowing a free
concurrence of actions, while the defence is to be assessed under a national
law which does not allow such a concurrence, but applies the principle
of non-cumul des responsabilités. Some insight might be gained from the
way actions based on tort and contract have been coordinated in the
Rome II Regulation. Even if the law of one state applies to a tort,
because that is the country in which the damage occurs,115 the law of
another state will apply nonetheless if it is clear that the tort has a
manifestly closer connection with that country. Such a connection may
be based in particular on the pre-existing relationship between the
parties, such as a contract, which is closely connected with the tort in
question.116 This escape is to be understood in the light of Recital 14 of
the Rome II Regulation:
111 I. Pretelli, ‘Cross-border credit protection against fraudulent transfers of assets. Actio
Pauliana in the conflict of law’, Yearbook of Private International Law 2011-13, p. 629-640.
112 Art. 4 (1) Insolvency Regulation.
113 Art. (2)(m) Insolvency Regulation. According to Vonken, these rules have an accumulative
character. See Asser/Vonken 10-I, Algemeen deel IPR, nr. 213, with reference to HR 24
October 1997, NJ 1999/316 (Gustafsen/Mosk) and HR 7 March 2003, NJ 2003/128
(Cikam/Siemon).
114 Art. 13 Insolvency Regulation.
115 Art. 4 (1) Rome II Regulation.
116 Art. 4 (3) Rome II Regulation.
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‘The requirement of legal certainty and the need to do justice in individual cases
are essential elements of an area of justice. This Regulation provides for the
connecting factors which are the most appropriate to achieve these objectives.
Therefore, this Regulation provides for a general rule but also for specific rules
and, in certain provisions, for an “escape clause” which allows a departure
from these rules where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the
tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with another country. This set of
rules thus creates a flexible framework of conflict-of-law rules. Equally, it enables
the court seised to treat individual cases in an appropriate manner.’
When we turn to insolvency cases like Favini’s, it is clear that the
requirements of legal certainty and justice in individual cases stress the
need for a coordinated approach. The various interests at stake before or
during bankruptcy need to be weighed and balanced, as is shown at least
in the Dutch context, with various outcomes: the general actio Pauliana
should be outweighed by the specific actio Pauliana brought by the
liquidator on behalf of all creditors, while the interests of existing
creditors should be weighed against the right of creditors of a newly
founded company to rely on the rationale of its existence.
Clearly, a court should be granted some flexibility to find the appro-
priate law to apply. This is what could be learned from civil lawyers, that
the possibility of concurrence of claims and defences needs to be
addressed in any attempt to harmonise the insolvency law in Europe,
including its private international law aspects. Rather than formulating
specific escape clauses for every possible problem, private law shows
another possible route: the acceptance and development of a general
concept of concurrence, to be used to coordinate between different
applicable claims and defences.
7. Call of Duty 2.0
To concur or not, that’s the question. In the context of Bob Wessels’ field
of expertise, European Insolvency Law, the multiplication, overlap and
conflict of different legal levels and sites is sharply demonstrated.
The division of the Favini company sparks different actions and defences
– rooted in European law, insolvency law and private law. Those who aim
for one harmonised system of European private law or of European
insolvency law, but also private international law, should take the inter-
action between those regimes into account. Although Europe’s systems of
private law share the same issues of concurrence, they do not seem to
share a commonly negotiated method of interpretation to solve those
issues – yet. That is not to say that there is no need for such a method,
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developed with private relationships in mind. After Bob Wessels’ call of
duty, which brought about this insight, a second call of duty is appropriate
now: to design a European framework to assess issues of concurrence.
The Dutch framework might serve as an inspiring starting point.
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